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Abstract In this editorial, we set out the aims in the call
to publish papers on informal statistical inference, ran-
domness, modelling and risk. We discuss how the papers
published in this issue have responded to those aims. In
particular, we note how the nine papers contribute to some
of the major debates in mathematics and statistics educa-
tion, often taking contrasting positions. Such debates range
across: (1) whether knowledge is fractured or takes the
form of mental models; (2) heuristic or intuitive thinking
versus operational thinking as for example in dual process
theory; (3) the role of different epistemic resources, such as
perceptions, modelling, imagery, in the development of
probabilistic reasoning; (4) how design and situation
impact upon probabilistic learning.
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Probability, statistics, data handling and stochastics are
different names for what is taught at school level in various
countries. Factually we find an overlap in these topics but
we recognise that different names often carry different
meanings and philosophies or fundamental ideas of the
subject (Burrill & Biehler, 2011). For this special issue, we
were particularly interested in the role of probability rela-
ted to data analysis and we invited scholars to submit
papers addressing at least one of the following three sub-
themes influencing the current debate:
(i) We were interested in studies of informal inference,
including sampling distributions and routes to formal
inference. We recognized that informal inference
might be seen either as an essential skill for the
statistically literate citizen or as the root to a
sophisticated understanding of formal inference.
Either way, we saw probabilistic thinking as an
essential component in making judgements about the
reasonableness of patterns and trends identified in
data, especially in an era when recent developments
have focussed on data handling, to some extent
marginalising the role of probability (Konold &
Kazak 2008; Borovcnik, 2011).
(ii) Randomness and variation in the short and long term
in data sets generated by experiments have been the
foci of several studies over the last two decades
(recent examples include: Abrahamson, 2006;
Paparistodemou et al., 2008; Pratt & Noss 2002).
Given the importance of this central idea to proba-
bilistic reasoning, we invited contributions that would
report on recent studies in this particular area.
(iii) Finally, we were interested in studies of modelling
and risk, including theoretical, experimental and
subjective probability. In a sense this theme antic-
ipated where we might see new developments in
research on uncertainty. As technological tools
become ever more sophisticated, there are new
possibilities for introducing modelling into younger
students’ thinking. It has been argued (Burrill &
Biehler; 2011; Konold et al., 2007) that, whereas
typical school curricula focus on classical probability
as exemplified by spinners, coins and dice,
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professional statisticians and workplace applications
are much concerned with probabilities that can only
be estimated in frequentist or subjective terms. We
invited studies that might be researching new
opportunities in areas such as risk-based decision
making.
In this short editorial, we introduce the reader to nine
papers, published in response to this invitation. In fact,
many of the papers of this special issue use designs that
essentially rely on the use of technology, particularly for
simulating stochastic processes and analysing the data
produced (see Biehler et al. 2012 for more details on
technology use in probability and statistics). Most of the
papers touch on more than one of these topics. The papers
which mainly focus on (i) above are those by Ben-Zvi et al.
and Pfannkuch et al.; those that contribute mainly to (ii)
above are by Schnell and Prediger, Chernoff, Prodromou
and Abrahamson; finally, Eichler and Vogel speak pri-
marily to (iii) above, as well as Pratt et al. and Garfield
et al., though the latter fits well into (i). In our commentary
below, we will discuss the relevance of the specific papers
to these topics. The papers often take different positions in
some of the key ongoing debates in mathematics and sta-
tistics education. In this editorial, we look across the papers
and highlight those debates, beginning with the nature of
mathematical or statistical abstraction.
Since Piaget & Inhelder’s seminal work (1975) on the
origin of chance, there has been particular interest in how
notions of randomness and key probabilistic concepts such
as the Law of Large Numbers develop. Indeed, one account
of why probability is regarded as a difficult concept is
based around their assertion that probability is dependent
on: (i) randomness, which at earlier stages cannot be
accommodated within operational thinking; (ii) propor-
tional reasoning; (iii) combinations and permutations;
according to Piagetian theory, (ii) and (iii) require formal
operational thinking, the organism’s highest cognitive
achievement. While stage theory approaches are perhaps
now less popular in modern research, constructivism con-
tinues to have a strong influence on research into the
development of mathematical and statistical abstraction
and this is evident in many of the papers in this issue where
echoes of assimilation, accommodation and reflective
abstraction can be discerned.
A common interest in recent decades has been to iden-
tify what experiences during early years of schooling might
facilitate learning probability. In particular there has been a
focus on how learners might respond to experiencing sit-
uations where outcomes are uncertain. Fischbein (1975)
argued that primary intuitions for the stochastic could be
nurtured through systematic schooling, allowing cognitive
development well before probability is invented through
formal operations. Indeed, researching how experience
shapes intuitions could be seen as lying at the heart of
several papers in this issue (in particular, those by Schnell
& Prediger, Eichler & Vogel, Ben-Zvi et al. and Pratt
et al.).
In this issue, Schnell and Prediger refer to vertical and
horizontal development. While horizontal development
describes conceptual change that extends across changing
contexts for the same concept, vertical development focu-
ses on students’ development of new conceptions, which
substitute initial conceptions. Insofar as a vertical devel-
opment might be seen as abstraction to ‘higher’ concepts
and horizontal might be seen as generalising across con-
texts. Pratt and Noss (2002) have argued that development
occurs essentially through a broadening of the contextual
neighbourhood by bringing more context into meaning-
making and that abstraction away from context is an illu-
sion. However, in their study, Schnell and Prediger adopted
the notion of ‘construct’ from the model of abstraction in
context proposed by Schwarz et al. (2009) to explore stu-
dents’ development of thinking about randomness in the
short and long term in terms of horizontal and vertical
development. They propose four categories of micropro-
cesses that contribute to vertical and horizontal lines of
conceptual change. Under the vertical line of conceptual
change, they include actions such as ‘refining or broaden-
ing the scope of applicability’, which Pratt and Noss had
seen as a key aspect of the micro-evolution of knowledge.
However Pratt and Noss made no distinction between these
actions and those categorized as horizontal by Schnell and
Prediger, such as ‘building complementary contexts’ and
‘transferring constructs to different settings’. The question
remains whether there is theoretical leverage in distin-
guishing between ‘broadening the scope of applicability’
and ‘transferring constructs to different settings’. It may
help to resolve this difference in the future by referring to
recent work on transfer, in particular the notion of ‘transfer
in pieces’ (Wagner, 2006), which argues that there are
different types of transfer.
In contrast to the theory developed by Schnell and
Prediger, Eichler and Vogel’s paper in this issue uses
mental models as its theoretical lens. They argue against
Piagetian stage theory and propose an alternative in which
mental models are seen as representations of an entire
situation, rejecting the use of semantic representations of
isolated propositions.
The Schnell and Prediger and Eichler and Vogel posi-
tions stand either side of a hotly contested debate (diSessa,
2008). On the one hand, conceptual change is seen as the
gradual alignment of knowledge that begins in a fragmented
state. On the other hand, relatively large and coherent
conceptual models of the behaviour of phenomena replace
prior models through substitution. Nevertheless, a major
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contribution of Eichler and Vogel in this issue is that they
consider how young students, prior to explicit teaching on
probability, make sense of uncertain situations where the
sample space is not countable. This stands in contrast to
most research on probabilistic reasoning that has focused
on coins, spinners and dice, in which it is possible to
identify a sample space of countable and equally likely
outcomes. Indeed, Pratt (2011) has urged more research in
this area to inform the development of new curricula that
escape the limitations of approaches that focus narrowly on
increasingly irrelevant artefacts such as coins, spinners and
dice.
Eichler and Vogel argue that young students might not
even recognize that situations could be seen as random and
so seek in their method to avoid leading them to any such
conclusion. They offer a range of situations to which their
subjects have to respond. They suggest that students cannot
be ascribed general levels of cognition since their levels are
in fact dependent on the complexity of the specific tasks.
Such a conclusion might easily have been drawn via other
theoretical positions but what is novel in this study is that
they analyse the complexity of their situations according to
how visible are the objects and data and whether the tasks
demand an inference to be made.
Schnell and Prediger created situations in which the
students experienced in a direct way the uncertainty
apparent in the experiments they conducted. Similarly,
Prodromou in this issue reports on pre-service teachers,
who reason about connections between experimental and
theoretical probability in the light of experience during a
course that involved manipulation of material and virtual
objects. We have also discussed how Eichler and Vogel’s
tasks urged the students to imagine scenarios that might
stimulate mental models. However, Abrahamson in this
issue questions whether abstracting from experience is the
only, or even the best, approach for accepting the logic of
combinatorics. He emphasises how experience can be
misleading, such as when students do not discern Head/Tail
and Tail/Head as distinct events when flipping a pair of
coins. In other words, probability in its formal sense is
unlikely to be accommodated, in Piagetian terms, until
students are able to construct a combinatoric approach to
probability. Abrahamson argues that perceptual reasoning
provides an alternative to experimentation as an epistemic
resource to ground the logic of combinatorial analysis. A
pedagogy based on building upon perceptions, exploiting
carefully customised event spaces, might effectively sup-
plement experience.
We should stress that much of Abrahamson’s work
(2007) has in fact focussed on providing experiences as a
basis for students to make connecting bridges between
different epistemologies for probability and it is clear that
the position taken in this paper is one in which he reminds
the reader that such an approach should not exclude
methods based on the perceptions.
We note the potential for modelling approaches in
relation to Abrahamson’s position since engagement with
the modelling cycle demands the construction of a first
model, which may well be based on initial perceptions,
which will then be modified iteratively by experiences of
running that model and comparing the outcomes with
expectations. Garfield et al. report in this issue on their
novel design for a tertiary level course, based on the
assumption that modelling phenomena is key in developing
statistical thinking. Although statistical models lie at the
heart of the discipline, courses at either school or college
level have not generally been built around modelling as the
central activity. Garfield et al. chose Tinkerplots to be the
main modelling tool used by the students. They designed
open-ended tasks that would motivate students to create
and evaluate stochastic models. For example, the students
have to decide whether multiple playlists from an iPod
shuffle were in fact randomly generated, as claimed by the
manufacturer.
A third way is proposed in this issue by Pfannkuch et al.
Rather than focussing on perceptions or modelling, they
emphasise imagery. Their methods of course recognise the
power of initial perceptions and how modelling might be
utilised to enhance reasoning but Pfannkuch et al. promote
the use of imagery in designing a teaching pathway that
begins with elementary understanding of sampling at about
14 years of age and culminates in a sound appreciation of
confidence intervals at tertiary level. The authors argue in
the paper that the pathway should lead to appreciation of
confidence intervals rather than significance testing.
Technology is an important tool since some of the methods
such as bootstrapping confidence intervals are not feasible
without technology use but, throughout the development,
the aim, whether achieved through the use of technology or
not, is to facilitate the construction of powerful images for
key statistical concepts.
The reports by Abrahamson, Garfield et al. and Pfann-
kuch et al. offer insights into how perception, modelling,
simulation and imagery might provide valuable epistemic
resources for the construction of probabilistic concepts.
Pfannkuch et al. argue that the conceptual pathway towards
confidence intervals needs to begin at an early age, refer-
ring in fact to age 14 years. Ben-Zvi et al. report in this
issue on a study, which draws on all of these epistemic
resources but at a much younger age, 11 years. Again
deploying Tinkerplots, their study builds on earlier work
into growing samples (Bakker & Frederickson, 2005)
whereby students begin with small data sets and are
encouraged to make inferences about the class as a whole.
These initial perceptions are expected to be insufficient or
inaccurate when the data about the whole class are
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analysed. In a similar way the data for the class are then
used to make inferences about a larger group such as the
whole year, and so on. The use of Tinkerplots allows the
students to create images of the data and so draw inferences
in the spirit of exploratory data analysis (EDA). They
report on the increasingly sophisticated expressions of
uncertainty that emerge as the students continue to grow
their samples.
The role of the growing samples task is key to the
development of the probabilistic language that Ben-Zvi
et al. report. Indeed, the criticality of task design and sit-
uation is a theme that runs through all of the above papers.
Schnell and Prediger carried out a microanalysis of stu-
dents playing a race game and uncovered highly situated
microprocesses. Eichler and Vogel’s analysis picked out
the visibility of the objects and data as critical elements in
determining the level of complexity of a task. Abrahamson
reports on how opportunities to experience phenomena
might at least be supplemented by tasks that exploit stu-
dents’ perceptions. Garfield et al. invented new modelling
tasks in order to implement a course that might stimulate
the growth of statistical thinkers. Pfannkuch et al. reported
on a series of design principles that they feel should
underpin the design of a conceptual pathway that aims to
facilitate stochastic knowledge and ultimately understand-
ing of confidence intervals.
The report in this issue by Pratt et al. follows this theme.
Recognising the opportunities and needs for teaching and
learning of risk, they have built a microworld to research
mathematics and science teachers’ knowledge of risk, situ-
ated in this case in a fictitious young woman’s dilemma as to
whether to have an operation that might cure her back con-
dition. They search for a way of accounting for the decisions
that the teachers made, and for the deep use of personal
experience and other contextual factors that seemed to shape
the decision-making process. Their review of the literature
led them to the Priority Heuristic (Brandsta¨tter et al., 2006),
which is a recently published description of how people make
decisions. The Priority Heuristic is part of the school of
thought, led by Gigerenzer et al. (1999), which asserts that
heuristics are natural and effective ways of making decisions
and, within any constrained situation, may prove more
effective than methods dependent on formal logic. In their
study, Pratt et al. found that the teachers’ decision making did
often conform to the logic of the Priory Heuristic but that
important insights could be gained by careful analysis of the
apparent discrepancies.
Gigerenzer has been a critic of the seminal work on
heuristics by Kahneman et al. (1982), which has been
highly influential on research into probabilistic thinking.
More recently, Kahneman has recognised that a weakness
in the original heuristics and biases research was its lack of
a theoretical underpinning, and so has realigned the
original analysis by bringing it into the broad field of
research on dual-process theories (Kahneman & Frederick,
2002), so that their research on heuristics and biases is seen
as part of System 1, the fast intuitive dimension of decision
making and reasoning. In contrast System 2 relates to a
slower, more reflective, analytic type of reasoning. In this
issue, Chernoff criticises how, although heuristics such as
representativeness have been an ongoing reference point to
researchers in statistics education in recent decades, they
have been slow to adopt the freshly aligned perspective on
that original research. In particular, Chernoff draws on the
notion that, when people are confronted with a difficult
question, and perhaps have few resources (for example
time and tools) to analyse that question, their ‘fast’
response will often be to replace the difficult question with
an easier one, a process referred to as ‘attribute substitu-
tion’. Chernoff’s study uses that notion to analyse
responses of prospective mathematics teachers to a task in
which they decide which of two answer keys to a multiple
choice quiz is more likely.
With the incorporation of heuristics into System 1 of
dual process theory, attribute substitution is seen as a fast
response to some demand, much as Fischbein’s primary
and secondary intuitions. The subjects in the range of
studies presented in this issue are encouraged, whether
through drawing on modelling, perceptions, simulations or
imagery, to mix fast intuitive responses with more careful
analytic thinking, the hallmark of System 2, accessible
through the sort of formal operational thinking that Piaget
envisaged. Research will need to continue its efforts to
understand what sorts of pedagogic mix between intuitive
System 1 and formal analytic System 2 thinking might be
most influential in supporting the development of proba-
bilistic reasoning.
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